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JURISDICTION
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
case at hand because this action arose under the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1319, which qualifies as "the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
This Court has jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In granting sum-
mary judgment for Goldthumb on all issues, the District Court for
the District of New Union issued a final order that disposed of all
parties' claims. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over the ap-
peals from that order.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is the addition of a pollutant to a temporarily dry
riverbed a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)?
2. Is federal regulation of a temporarily dry riverbed of an
interstate stream a valid exercise of authority under
the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3?
3. Does 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) require a State to have an
approved permit program in order to deprive EPA of
jurisdiction under § 1319?
4. Does 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) require a State to enforce
using authority comparable to the CWA in order to
deprive EPA of jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1319?
5. Does 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) deprive EPA of jurisdiction
under § 1319 to enforce against violations when a
State has already enforced against them?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
brought this enforcement action under the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251, 1319, alleging Goldthumb Mining Co. Inc. (Goldthumb)
violated the CWA by discharging pollutants into a navigable water
without a permit issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
Goldthumb filed a motion for summary judgment for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds. First, Goldthumb as-
serts that the Arroyo d'Oro is not subject to the CWA for two rea-
sons: (1) the Arroyo d'Oro, when dry, is not included within the
CWA's definition of "navigable waters," and (2) Congress lacks the
constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over discharges
2003] 1001
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into the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. Second, Goldthumb asserts
that 33 U.S.C. § 1319 precludes EPA enforcement when a state
has already taken an enforcement action. The District Court
granted Goldthumb's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the Arroyo d'Oro was not within the CWA's definition
of "navigable waters" and did not reach the Constitutional or pre-
clusion questions.
The State of New Union joins EPA in opposing Goldthumb's
claim that Arroyo d'Oro is not subject to regulation under the
CWA. Notwithstanding its support of EPA on the first ground,
however, New Union joins Goldthumb in arguing that New
Union's enforcement actions preclude EPA from bringing this
action.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Goldthumb operates a gold mining operation in a desert area
within the State of New Union. To extract the gold from the ore,
Goldthumb places crushed ore on an impermeable pad and
drenches the pile in a cyanide bath which leaches the gold out of
the ore. The spent bath is then collected and stored in impermea-
ble evaporation ponds. The rate of evaporation usually exceeds
the rate that new bath is added to the ponds, and most of the cya-
nide and heavy metals accumulate in sludge at the bottom of the
ponds. (R. at 2).
Periodically, rainfall around the Goldthumb operation is suffi-
cient to cause liquid to accumulate in the ponds faster than it
evaporates. The filling of the ponds during these rainy periods
creates the possibility that the ponds may overflow and release
dangerous pollutants. An overflow may cause the berms that
form the ponds to rupture, releasing all of the contents, including
the cyanide-laden sludge. To prevent this catastrophic failure
during the rainy season, Goldthumb drains portions of the liquid
through a series of pipes and ultimately discharges the liquid onto
the dry bed of an arroyo (a small steep-sided watercourse). By
draining this liquid prior to the rainy season in August of each
year, Goldthumb is able to maintain freeboard in its evaporation
ponds. (R. at 2).
The Arroyo d'Oro, into which Goldthumb discharges the liq-
uid from the evaporation ponds, is typically dry. After major
storms, however, water runs through the arroyo for several days.
(R. at 2). Periodically, storms near the Goldthumb operation are
sufficient to cause the water in the arroyo to flow across the bor-
[Vol. 20
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der to the neighboring State of Progress, thirty-seven miles away.
About five miles after crossing into Progress, the water in the Ar-
royo d'Oro enters the Greenheaven Wildlife Preserve and feeds
into a permanent three-acre pool that serves as habitat for the
endangered Greenheaven Pupfish. (R. at 2-3).
In April 2000, the New Union Department of Environmental
Protection (NUDEP) began ongoing regulation of Goldthumb's dis-
charges from the evaporation ponds. At that time, NUDEP issued
an administrative order prohibiting Goldthumb from discharging
pond liquid into the Arroyo when waters of the state are present
or at any other time without prior permission. In July 2000,
Goldthumb requested NUDEP's permission to drain some liquid
from the evaporation ponds. A NUDEP inspector found that the
ponds were in danger of overflowing during the coming rainy sea-
son and that there was no water flowing in the Arroyo d'Oro.
Based on these findings, NUDEP gave Goldthumb permission for
limited draining in order to protect against a catastrophic failure
of the berms forming the sides of the ponds. (R. at 3).
NUDEP has continued to be actively involved in the regula-
tion of Goldthumb's discharges. In April 2002, NUDEP issued a
second administrative order similar in material respects to the
earlier order. In July 2002, Goldthumb requested permission to
drain some liquid from the ponds and matters proceeded in the
same manner as the July 2000 request. NUDEP has expressed its
intention to issue a new administrative order similar to the previ-
ous orders. (R. at 3). EPA then brought this enforcement action
under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1319, against Goldthumb.
EPA asserts that the discharges from the evaporation ponds vio-
lated the CWA because they were made without a permit issued
under 33. U.S.C. § 1342. (R. at 1).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By discharging contaminated wastewater from its mining op-
erations into a waterway, Goldthumb has violated and continues
to violate the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (proscribing the discharge of
any pollutant from any point source into navigable waters).
Goldthumb's contaminated water is a "pollutant" and the pipes
from which the water drains is a "point source." The CWA defines
"navigable waters" as "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251. Even when the Arroyo d'Oro is dry, it qualifies as "naviga-
ble waters" or "waters of the United States" for two reasons. First,
EPA has defined "waters of the United States" as including inter-
20031 1003
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mittent streams such as the Arroyo d'Oro. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
EPA's definition is reasonable and does not conflict with congres-
sional intent, so EPA's definition is entitled to deference from this
Court. Second, federal judicial precedent shows that the term
"waters of the United States" includes temporarily dry riverbeds
and arroyos.
Contrary to the district court's holding, no constitutional
doubt exists regarding Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate waterways like the Arroyo d'Oro for three rea-
sons. First, numerous federal court decisions have held that Con-
gress has clear power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
both interstate and traditionally navigable waters. Second, when
activities will directly harm endangered species, courts have con-
sistently held that Congress has Commerce Clause power to regu-
late those activities. Finally, as applied to the facts of this case,
CWA jurisdiction over the Arroyo d'Oro meets the Supreme Court
commerce power test of Lopez. See United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995). Therefore, exercising jurisdiction over
commercial activities that impact a tributary of interstate waters
upon which endangered species depend for survival does not in-
voke the outer limits of Congress' power or alter the federal-state
balance by allowing federal encroachment upon a traditional state
power.
The Clean Water Act does not permit EPA enforcement where
States have taken enforcement actions. Congress has made it
clear that States are the preferred enforcers of the Act and that
citizens and EPA serve supplementary enforcement roles only
when a State has failed to meet its enforcement obligation. The
primacy of the State's role, as well as the statutory language, fail
to support EPA's assertion that only States with approved permit
programs may preclude EPA enforcement. New Union's enforce-
ment action regarding the discharges from the evaporation ponds
is sufficient to support application of the § 1319(g) bar on EPA
enforcement.
EPA further asserts that New Union's actions do not preclude
EPA enforcement because the actions were not taken under "com-
parable state law." The § 1319(g) bar should be understood as
protecting the State's role as the preferred enforcer and the inter-
ests of the regulated party. Although NUDEP has the statutory
authority to assess civil penalties similar to those included in
§ 1319, it chose to exercise authority granted under another stat-
ute better suited to the facts in this case. Allowing EPA enforce-
[Vol. 20
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ment undermines New Union's primary role and would replace
the judgment of local officials with the judgment of federal regula-
tors. Furthermore, EPA enforcement would reopen the matter
and subject Goldthumb to duplicative regulatory proceedings.
New Union has created authority similar to the CWA and has
taken the necessary actions in regulating Goldthumb's conduct.
Finally, the district court correctly held that NUDEP's en-
forcement action against Goldthumb prevents EPA from seeking
injunctive relief under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). First, the text and leg-
islative history of the CWA strongly suggest that Congress in-
tended EPA enforcement actions to supplement, not supplant,
State enforcement action. In this case, if EPA could seek injunc-
tive relief it would supplant NUDEP's enforcement actions by
making Goldthumb's receipt of permission from NUDEP to re-
lease pond waters irrelevant. Additonally, if EPA can seek injunc-
tive relief, State agencies would have little to no power to
negotiate compliance with violators. Since State action would
only preclude further imposition of civil penalties, little incentive
would exist for a violator to negotiate with a State because it
would still be vulnerable to an EPA action for injunctive relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Butler
v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing an agency's construction of a
statute and interpretation of its own regulations, deferential stan-
dards apply. An agency's interpretation of its own regulation has
"controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). A court must defer to the responsible agency's construc-
tion of a statute if such construction is reasonable and not in con-
flict with the expressed intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
When reviewing a challenge to the constitutionality of a con-
gressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause, a court
must uphold the exercise of power if "a rational basis exists for
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce"
and "the means chosen were reasonably adapted to the end per-
mitted by the Constitution." Deer Park Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris
County Appraisal Dist., 132 F.3d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1998). The
challenger has a high burden to overcome these standards. Id.
20031 1005
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ARGUMENT
I. THE DISCHARGE OF A POLLUTANT INTO A
TEMPORARILY DRY RIVERBED VIOLATES 33
U.S.C. § 1362
The CWA prohibits the discharge of a pollutant from a point
source to a navigable water without a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1342, 1362. In the present case, Goldthumb drains water
from its contaminated evaporation ponds into the Arroyo d'Oro
riverbed before the rainy season, when the river is dry.
Goldthumb does not have a permit for such discharges. The dis-
trict court stated that the contaminated water is a "pollutant" and
the pipes from which the water drains constitutes a "point source."
The only remaining issue is whether draining the contaminated
water into the Arroyo d'Oro when the river is dry qualifies as an
"addition of any pollutant ... to navigable water." See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7), (12).
Goldthumb's actions constitute an addition of a pollutant to
navigable water for two reasons. First, in the CWA implementing
regulations, EPA has defined "waters of the United States" as in-
cluding intermittent streams such as the Arroyo d'Oro. See 40
C.F.R. § 122.2. Because EPA's definition is reasonable and does
not conflict with congressional intent, EPA's definition is entitled
to deference from this Court. Second, federal judicial precedent
indicates that the term "waters of the United States" includes
temporarily dry riverbeds and arroyos.
A. EPA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CWA AS COVERING
ARROYOS WHEN THEY ARE DRY DESERVES
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The CWA regulations promulgated by EPA include "intermit-
tent streams" within the definition of "waters of the United
States," bringing arroyos under CWA jurisdiction. EPA's action
against Goldthumb for discharging into the Arroyo d'Oro when it
is dry indicates that EPA has interpreted "intermittent streams"
to include arroyos when they are dry, and this Court should defer
to EPA's interpretation. Further, statutory construction supports
the reasonableness of EPA's definition, and legislative history
demonstrates that EPA's definition comports with congressional
intent. Therefore, EPA's definition is entitled to deference, and
[Vol. 20
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this Court should reverse the district court and hold that the CWA
covers arroyos.
1. EPA Regulations Defining "Waters of the Unites States"
as Including Intermittent Streams Brings Arroyos
Under the CWA
An agency's interpretation of its own regulation has "control-
ling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
For purposes of exercising jurisdiction under the CWA, EPA regu-
lations define "waters of the United States" as including "intermit-
tent streams." See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. EPA interprets
"intermittent streams" to include arroyos when they are dry, as
evidenced by this litigation. This interpretation is far from
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with" 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, so the
district court erred in holding that "EPA's inclusion of intermit-
tent bodies of water within its definition of navigable waters
means that they are navigable waters only when they are bodies
of water, not when they are dry land." (R. at 6)
When intermittent streams have water and are flowing, then
they are simply "streams." See Webster's New Collegiate Diction-
ary 1150 (1973) (defining "stream" as "a body of running water...
flowing on the earth" or "any body of flowing fluid"). Therefore, if
EPA regulations covered discharges to intermittent streams only
when they are flowing, then the regulation's language, "including
intermittent streams," would have no independent meaning be-
cause it would not describe any condition separate from "streams."
To give all terms in the regulation independent meaning, the term
"intermittent streams" must include such streams when they are
dry. "A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage" sup-
ports the reasonableness of EPA's interpretation of its regulation.
See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995). Thus, this Court should
defer to EPA's interpretation and hold that the CWA applies to the
Arroyo d'Oro at all times.
Federal courts have deferred to EPA's interpretation and ap-
plied the CWA to arroyos and intermittent streams when those
waterways are dry. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld EPA's determination that the CWA applied to dis-
charges to arroyos, regardless of whether water was flowing when
the discharge occurred. Quivira Mining Co. v. United States
2003] 1007
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Envt'l Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d,126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 611 F2d 345, 347 (10th Cir
1980) ("It makes no difference that a stream was or was not at the
time of the spill discharging water continuously into a river navi-
gable in the traditional sense.").
2. EPA's Interpretation of the CWA Is Entitled to
Deference Because It Is Reasonable and Not In
Conflict With Congressional Intent
A court must defer to the responsible agency's construction of
a statute if such construction is reasonable and not in conflict with
the expressed intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def Council, 467 U.S. at 842-45. The district court rejected
EPA's interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 1251(12), which defines "navi-
gable waters" as "waters of the United States," based upon a strict
interpretation of the words "navigable" and "waters." (R. at 4-6).
The court held that because the Arroyo d'Oro is not navigable-in-
fact, and because Goldthumb's discharges were not into actual
water, Goldthumb did not discharge into "navigable water." This
narrow textual interpretation fails for the following reasons: (1) it
undermines the explicit goals of the CWA, (2) it directly contra-
dicts legislative history and congressional intent behind the CWA,
(3) it ignores the omission of the word "navigable" from the defini-
tion of "navigable waters," and (4) it leads to an absurd and
counter-productive result by allowing a major loophole in the Act.
Legislative history shows that Congress intended "that the
term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitu-
tional interpretation." See Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 144; see also H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131
(containing similar language). This intent resonates with the
statutory goals of the CWA, to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a), and to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
those waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). To realize these laudable
goals, Congress recognized that "[w]ater moves in hydrologic cy-
cles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at
the source." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 77 (1972). Against the back-
drop of this overarching policy of improving and maintaining the
quality of the United State's water resources, rhetorical argu-
ments of what constitutes a discharge "into water" become mean-
ingless. Therefore, discharging contaminated waste into the
Arroyo d'Oro, that will eventually carry such pollution through in-
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terstate hydrologic cycles, clearly falls within the intended scope
of the CWA.
Significantly, during the 1972 amendments to the CWA, Con-
gress deleted the word "navigable" from the definition of "naviga-
ble waters" that had originally appeared in the House version of
the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see also Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce
Clause Challenge, But Can the Endangered Species Act?, 7 Has-
tings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 191, 195 (2001). The definition
of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States" therefore
requires a broad interpretation to comply with congressional in-
tent and the textual structure of the statutory definition.
The district court's strict interpretation limiting "navigable
waters" to liquid H20 that is navigable-in-fact tortures the broad
statutory definition and leads to potentially absurd results. It is
undisputed that Goldthumb discharges contaminated water into a
riverbed that will eventually flow with water and carry the pollu-
tion into other permanent, interstate waterways. If the CWA does
not prohibit such activity, Goldthumb and other polluters could
easily subvert the intended purposes of the CWA by discharging
into temporarily dry riverbeds. When the intermittent streams
flow, the pollution will directly degrade the quality of our nation's
water and undermine the goals of the CWA. To allow such a loop-
hole in the administration of the CWA would lead to absurd and
counter-productive results. Therefore, EPA's interpretation of
"waters of the United States" to include discharges into tempora-
rily dry waterways is more than reasonable in light of the goal of
the CWA to eliminate water pollution.
B. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT SHOWS THAT THE TERM
"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES" TAKES A
FUNCTIONAL MEANING THAT INCLUDES
TEMPORARILY DRY RIVERBEDS AND ARROYOS
Supreme Court and other federal court precedents strongly
support the interpretation of "waters of the United States" as in-
cluding temporarily dry riverbeds such as the Arroyo d'Oro. The
Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview stated that "Congress evi-
dently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on fed-
eral regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and ...
to regulate... waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under
the classical understanding of that term." United States v. River-
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side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). The Court
then held that CWA jurisdiction extends to wetlands that are adja-
cent to bodies of open water because such wetlands "tend to drain"
into the open water. Id. at 134. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has correctly interpreted the Supreme Court's analysis and
holding in Riverside Bayview to emphasize that the CWA supports
a broad interpretation of what constitutes a discharge "into
water." See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 727 (3d Cir.
1993). The court in Pozsgai rejected defendants' argument that
the word "water" in the CWA means "the liquid state of H20," and
not wetlands, moist soil, or dry land that a federal agency deter-
mines should be regulated. Id. at 728.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held recently that whether a
stream was or was not flowing continuously at the time of dis-
charge does not affect applicability of the CWA. Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001). The
defendant in Headwaters had discharged pollutants into non-flow-
ing water, and the court focused on the ultimate water quality
consequences of the discharge to determine whether the water
was "water of the United States": "[The tributary] is capable of
spreading environmental damage and is thus a 'water of the
United States."' Id. Several federal courts have recognized that
congressional intent and statutory effectiveness require that the
CWA apply to intermittent streams and temporarily dry river-
beds. See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42
(11th Cir. 1997) (stating that to limit the meaning of "navigable
water" to fully flowing waterways would "defeat the intent of Con-
gress and would jeopardize the health of our nation's waters");
United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D.
Ariz. 1975) ("For the purposes of [the CWA] to be effectively car-
ried into realistic achievement, the scope of its control must ex-
tend to all pollutants which are discharged into any waterway,
including normally dry arroyos . ").
Goldthumb's discharges will undisputedly degrade open, in-
terstate waters when water flows through the Arroyo d'Oro and
carries Goldthumb's waste into permanent waters in the neigh-
boring State of Progress. According to the Supreme Court in Riv-
erside Bayview, such a "tend[encyl to drain" into open waters
brings the Arroyo d'Oro under the jurisdiction of the CWA. See 474
U.S. at 134. Further, extending CWA jurisdiction over the Arroyo
d'Oro comports with overall federal court jurisprudence; courts
broadly interpret "waters of the United States" to cover tempora-
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rily dry waterways and overall hydrologic cycles, rather than em-
ploying a strict definition of "waters" to mean only liquid H20. In
summary, statutory rules of construction, legislative history, and
federal jurisprudence overwhelmingly support the reasonableness
of EPA's interpretation of "waters of the United States" to include
discharges into arroyos when they are dry.
II. CONGRESS HAS AUTHORITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE TO REGULATE
TEMPORARILY DRY WATERBEDS OF
INTERSTATE STREAMS SUCH AS THE
ARROYO D'ORO
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the
power "[tlo regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Numerous federal court decisions
have held that Congress has clear power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate both interstate and traditionally navigable wa-
ters. See, e.g., United States v. Sasser, 967 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir.
1992), citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-72
(1979). Further, when activities will directly harm endangered
species, courts have consistently held that Congress has Com-
merce Clause power to regulate those activities. See, e.g., Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Finally, Congress' Commerce Clause power allows it to
regulate Arroyo d'Oro under the CWA as it satisfies the Commerce
Clause test espoused by the Supreme Court in Lopez. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995). Because exercising
jurisdiction over a tributary to interstate waters upon which en-
dangered species depend for survival does not invoke "the outer
limits of Congress' power" or alter "the federal-state framework by
permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power,"
there exists no constitutional doubt regarding Congress' power to
regulate such waters. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
683 (2001). Therefore, this Court should defer to EPA's reasona-
ble interpretation of "waters of the United States" to include all
interstate waterways and their tributaries, see 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
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A. JUDICIAL PRECEDENCE SHOWS THAT THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE EMPOWERS CONGRESS TO
REGULATE INTERSTATE WATERS,
IRREGARDLESS OF NAVIGABILITY
If a body of water is connected with a continuous interstate
waterway, then the water qualifies as "navigable waters of the
United States" over which federal jurisdiction based on the Com-
merce Clause power attaches. State of Georgia v. City of East
Ridge, 949 F. Supp. 1571, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Sasser,
967 F.2d at 996, citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 170-72. The
Fourth Circuit in Sasser emphasized four tests of whether a water
body falls under federal jurisdiction, only two of which refer to
traditional navigability. Id.
The District Court of Arizona extensively analyzed the inter-
state commerce justification of the CWA and held that the CWA
applies to "any waterway within the United States also including
normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where such
water will ultimately end up in public waters." Phelps Dodge
Corp., 391 F. Supp. at 1187 (emphasis added). Thus, the court did
not focus on navigability, but rather on the public nature of a body
of water. In other words, Congress has Commerce Clause power
over all waters that may eventually lead to waters that in any
manner may affect interstate commerce, despite traditional navi-
gability of such waters. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at1341-42; United
States v. Earth Sci.s, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1979).
Therefore, contrary to the district court's holding in the case at
hand, courts have consistently recognized that non-navigable wa-
ters can greatly affect interstate commerce.
B. GOLDTHUMB'S DISCHARGES INTO THE ARROYO
D'ORO SATISFY THE SUPREME COURT'S LOPEZ
TEST AND THEREFORE JUSTIFY FEDERAL
REGULATION UNDER THE CWA
The Supreme Court has determined that Congress may regu-
late three broad categories of activity under its Commerce Clause
power: (1) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, including persons or
things; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-559. In Lopez, the Court held that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal
offense to possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress'
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Commerce Clause power as it did not substantially affect inter-
state commerce. Id. at 551. The Court emphasized that the Act, a
criminal statute, was wholly unrelated to commerce. Id. at 561.
Five years after Lopez, the Court again applied its Commerce
Clause test in United States v. Morrison, appearing to narrow the
range of the third category. The Court held that the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 was not within Congress' Commerce
Clause powers, as it did not substantially affect interstate com-
merce. The Court found that gender-motivated violent crimes did
not have anything to do with commerce, stating that where the
Court has "sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity
based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate com-
merce, the activity has been some sort of economic endeavor."
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000).
In Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000), the
Fourth Circuit held that Congress' Commerce Clause power al-
lowed it to regulate the taking of endangered red wolves on pri-
vate land under the Endangered Species Act. Focusing its
analysis on the third Lopez category, the Court determined that
the taking of a red wolf was an economic activity due to the fact
that protection of commercial and economic assets was a primary
reason for the taking. Id. at 492. The court cited specifically the
impact on a "$29.2 billion national wildlife-related recreational in-
dustry that involves tourism and interstate travel" as well as sci-
entific research and the trade in fur pelts. Id. at 493-95.
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress had Commerce
Clause power to regulate the taking of an entirely intrastate spe-
cies of fly, under the channels and substantial effects prongs of the
Lopez analysis. Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046. The court held
that the transportation of endangered species, destruction of bi-
odiversity, and potential medicinal uses of species qualified as
channels and substantial effects of interstate commerce, justifying
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1046-47,
1053, 1056.
1. Regulation of Goldthumb's Discharges Into the Arroyo
d'Oro Qualifies as Regulation of a Channel, as Set
Forth by the Supreme Court in Lopez
"[TIhe authority of Congress to keep the channels of inter-
state commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been
frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
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States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)). Unlike the facts in Lopez, regu-
lation of Goldthumb's discharges into the Arroyo d'Oro, which con-
nects to interstate waters, qualifies as regulation of a channel of
interstate commerce for two reasons. First, unlike an entirely in-
trastate public school, the Arroyo d'Oro is a channel in a literal
sense because it contributes to a physical connection between the
States of New Union and Progress, carrying pollution and other
by-products of economic production across state lines. Such dispo-
sal of contaminated wastewater from gold mining activities easily
qualifies as an "injurious use" of the Arroyo d'Oro channel because
such waste ultimately comes to rest in the Greenheaven Wildlife
Preserve of the State of Progress. Second, even an entirely intra-
state endangered species such as the pupfish qualifies as a chan-
nel of interstate commerce, due to the historic transportation of
endangered species. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
2. Regulation of Goldthumb's Discharges Into the Arroyo
d'Oro Qualifies as Regulation of an Instrumentality,
as Set Forth by the Supreme Court in Lopez
"Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Shreveport
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)). Goldthumb's contaminated
sludge and pond water results from mining gold. This gold not
only likely flows in interstate commerce, but can also serve an in-
terstate fiscal investment function. Therefore, Goldthumb's dis-
charges result from the processing of an instrumentality of
commerce. Regulation of such discharges directly impacts the
commercial operations, production, and distribution of that in-
strumentality, gold. This Court should hold that regulation of
Goldthumb's discharges also qualifies as regulation of an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce.
3. Regulation of Goldthumb's Discharges Into the Arroyo
d'Oro Qualifies as Regulation of Substantial Effects
on Interstate Commerce, as Set Forth by the
Supreme Court in Lopez
"Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce .... ." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing N.L.R.B. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, at 37 (1937)).
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Goldthumb's mining operations and discharges are substantially
related to interstate commerce for three reasons. First, as an eco-
nomic activity which results in discharges into a tributary of an
interstate waterway, Goldthumb's gold mining operations sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Second, if Goldthumb's dis-
charges remain unregulated, it has an economic advantage over
gold mining operations in other states that incur additional costs
to comply with the CWA. Regulating polluters that rid themselves
of their economic by-products by discharging such wastes into
tributaries of interstate waters certainly balances the economic
advantage that an upstream polluter would otherwise have over a
downstream business in another state. See, e.g., C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (finding that
the urge to dispose of waste is fundamentally economic); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121-22 (1940) (upholding federal
wage and hour regulations so as to prevent states with higher
standards to be disadvantaged vis-a-vis states with lower
standards).
Third, the potentially negative effects of Goldthumb's dis-
charges on the endangered pupfish substantially relates to inter-
state commerce, even though the pupfish resides entirely within
the State of Progress, because overall destruction of biodiversity
and potential medicinal uses provide the substantial nexus be-
tween all endangered species and interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046. The Supreme Court has held
that the "incalculable value" of endangered species even out-
weighs public projects that cost millions of dollars. See Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978). The district
court's opinion that the Greenheaven pupfish does not enjoy fed-
eral protection because "the citizens of Progress see fit to spend
their tax dollars prolonging for a few generations the ultimate ex-
tinction of an otherwise unremarkable species" woefully disre-
gards federal and Supreme Court precedent. Not only will
Goldthumb's discharges potentially harm an endangered species,
but those pollution impacts result from out-of-state economic ac-
tivities, establishing an even more direct link to interstate com-
merce than the facts involved in Home Builders. 130 F.3d at 1043,
1046 (holding that Congress has commerce power to regulate a
local county construction project that would impact a purely intra-
state endangered species).
Even if this Court finds that Goldthumb's activities do not
alone substantially relate to interstate commerce, the aggregate
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effect of activities like Goldthumb's mining operations has a sub-
stantial relationship to interstate and warrants federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 127-28 (1942). In summary, the discharges resulting from
Goldthumb's activities meet any of the three factors of the Su-
preme Court's Lopez test. This Court should hold that Congress
has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate such
discharges.
C. CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING,
THE CANON OF CONSTRUING A STATUTE TO AVOID
CONSITUTIONAL DOUBT DOES NOT APPLY IN
THIS CASE
The Supreme Court has held that when an agency interpreta-
tion of a statute "invokes the outer limits of Congress' power" or
"alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal en-
croachment upon a traditional state power," Congress must
clearly intend such a result for the court to defer to the agency's
interpretation. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 683. In SWANCC, the
Supreme Court majority declined to analyze whether or not Con-
gress could extend the jurisdiction of the CWA to isolated, intra-
state, non-navigable, man-made ponds used by migratory birds
under its Commerce Clause power.
As shown earlier, courts have consistently understood the
Commerce Clause to allow federal regulation of both interstate
waters and activities that impact the critical habitat of endan-
gered species. The connection to interstate commerce resonates in
the inherently economic nature of water pollution, in addition to
the incalculable and established commercial value of endangered
species. Therefore, extending CWA jurisdiction over waterways
like the Arroyo d'Oro does not begin to approach the outer limits of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Further, the spe-
cific facts of the case at hand logically invoke the Commerce
Clause because Goldthumb's contaminated waste actually results
from commercial activities and ultimately travels via waterways
to the neighboring State of Progress, where the endangered
pupfish depends upon the integrity of the waters flowing from
New Union.
EPA's regulations also do not alter the federal-state balance
by permitting federal regulation of a traditional state power.
While states have traditional and primary power over land and
water use, such power only rests with intrastate, isolated waters.
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See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72 (holding that federal jurisdic-
tion over "ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule"' would infringe on the States' primary power over land and
water use); see also United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F.
Supp. 2d 843, 847 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that SWANCC's ruling
narrowly applies to water bodies that fall under the CWA by only
the Migratory Bird Rule); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1287 (D. Mont. 2001) (distinguishing SWANCC by the inter-
state nature of the water bodies at issue). The power of New
Union to manage the Arroyo d'Oro direct impacts the ability and
power of Progress to manage the Greenheaven Wildlife Preserve,
where discharges into the Arroyo d'Oro ultimately accumulate.
Federal jurisdiction naturally attaches in such circumstances, and
applying the CWA to the Arroyo d'Oro does not upset the federal-
state balance, but rather enhances it. Therefore, no constitutional
doubt exists in the applicability of the CWA to the Arroyo d'Oro,
and this Court should reverse the district court's holding to the
contrary.
III. STATES ARE NOT REQURIED TO HAVE PERMIT
PROGRAMS APPROVED UNDER THE CWA TO
PRECLUDE EPA ENFORCEMENT PURSUANT
TO 33 U.S.C. § 1319
The CWA does not allow EPA to initiate an enforcement ac-
tion under § 1319 when the State has already acted on the matter.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A). This bar applies when the State has ei-
ther commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action or has is-
sued a permit and required payment of a penalty. In this case,
NUDEP has undertaken consistent and ongoing enforcement ac-
tions to prevent discharges of pollutants by Goldthumb. NUDEP
has considered the matter and chosen the course of action that
best serves the interests of the State and protects the environ-
ment. EPA now seeks to reopen this matter and initiate enforce-
ment proceedings against Goldthumb for actions permitted by
NUDEP.
EPA attempts to avoid the § 1319(g) bar by contending that
only states with approved permit programs may preclude EPA en-
forcement pursuant to CWA § 1319(g). This unduly narrow read-
ing of the CWA supplants the State's primary enforcement role
and misconstrues the language of the Act. Congress clearly ex-
pressed its intent that the States serve as the primary enforcers of
the CWA and included provisions throughout the Act that protect
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that primary role. Beyond upsetting the balance of enforcement
power struck by Congress, EPA's interpretation requires this
Court to read a requirement into the Act that is not apparent on
its face. Federal courts have consistently refused to add words or
requirements when interpreting a statute. Bates v. United States,
522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997); 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing
Six Jars of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).
A. REQUIRING A STATE TO HAVE AN APPROVED PERMIT
PROGRAM IN ORDER TO APPLY THE § 1319(G) BAR
UNDERMINES THE STATE'S ROLE AS PRIMARY
ENFORCER OF THE CWA
Congress has clearly stated in the CWA that States are to
serve as the primary enforcers of the Act. "It is the policy of Con-
gress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibil-
ity of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . .. ."
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). The Senate Committee Report provides fur-
ther evidence of Congress' intent to place States in the primary
enforcement position: "The Committee does not intend this juris-
diction of the Federal government to supplant state enforcement.
Rather the Committee intends that the enforcement power of the
Federal government be available in cases where States and other
appropriate enforcement agencies are not acting expeditiously and
vigorously to enforce control requirements." S. Rep. No. 92-414 at
73-74 (1972), Reprinted in Legislative History of the Clean Water
Act, at 1481-82 (1973).
The primacy of State enforcement is especially appropriate in
cases, such as this one, where the geography and climate of the
State has created a unique situation requiring specially crafted
regulation. Congress explicitly stated that concerns about re-
gional differences in geography and climate prompted the protec-
tion of State enforcement under the Act. Miss. Comm'n on Natural
Res. v. Costle, 625 F. 2d 1269, 1275 (5th Cir. 1980). NUDEP's ex-
pertise placed it in the uniquely competent position to balance the
threats of a controlled discharge from the evaporation ponds
against the possibility of a catastrophic failure resulting in the re-
lease of highly contaminated sludge. After careful assessment of
the situation, NUDEP chose to permit the controlled release.
Congress carefully drafted the CWA not only to reflect the
preference for State enforcement of the Act but also to include pro-
visions protecting the State's primary role. The CWA prevents
both the United States and citizens from infringing upon the
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State's enforcement authority. EPA is precluded from initiating
enforcement where the State has taken appropriate action in ad-
dressing violations of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A). Con-
gress also refused to allow citizen's suits under substantially
similar circumstances. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Courts have consist-
ently interpreted these provisions as protecting the primary en-
forcer's role under the CWA. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Cheaspeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987); N. and S.
Rivers Watershed Ass. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st
Cir. 1991); Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 904 F. Supp.
1177, 1181 (D. Or. 1995); Pub. Interest Research Group of N. J. v.
Rice, 774 F. Supp. 317, 327 (D.N.J. 1991); Detroit Audubon Socy
v. City of Detroit, 696 F. Supp. 249, 259 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the
proper role of citizen's suits within the overall enforcement
scheme developed in the CWA. The Supreme Court held that en-
forcement actions by citizens are intended "to supplement rather
than to supplant governmental enforcement." Gwaltney, 484 U.S.
at 60. The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing a citizen suit
after EPA or State enforcement would severely curtail the govern-
ment's discretion in enforcing the Act in the public interest. Id. at
61.
The Court supported its decision with reference to the Senate
Committee Report which stated: "[t]he Committee intends the
great volume of enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,"
and that citizen suits are proper only "if the Federal, State, and
local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility." Id.
at 61 (quoting S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 64 (1972)). This congressional
statement allowed the Court to determine that actions by the sup-
plementary enforcers is appropriate only where the primary en-
forcer has failed to act. This reasoning extends to this case where
New Union's role as the preferred enforcer must be protected from
EPA intrusion, and New Union has exercised its enforcement re-
sponsibility by regulating Goldthumb's discharges from the evapo-
ration ponds and ensuring that the highly contaminated sludge
does not threaten the Arroyo D'Oro or the permanent pool in
Progress.
The Gwaltney Court further explained its reasoning with an
example strikingly similar to the instant case. The Court
imagined a situation where the Administrator issued a compli-
ance order to a violator of the Act and agreed not to assess civil
penalties on the condition that the violator take corrective actions
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not otherwise required by law. Unless the Court implements Con-
gress's intent that the governmental enforcement hold a primary
position, citizens may upset the settled agreement by initiating a
private action and seeking civil penalties. In addition to cur-
tailing governmental discretion in enforcing the CWA, such action
is fundamentally unfair and discourages settlements by violators.
Violators would be unlikely to enter into settlement agreements if
they believed that they could be subjected to further penalties
through the use of citizen's suits.
In the instant case, New Union, through NUDEP, exercised
its discretion in enforcing the CWA in the public interest. NUDEP
permitted Goldthumb to discharge water from the evaporation
ponds so as to eliminate the risk that the ponds may rupture and
release highly contaminated sludge. Goldthumb operated under
the assumption that its dealings with NUDEP were final and that
it would not be subject to prosecution for the discharges from the
evaporation ponds. As in the example in Gwaltney, allowing
EPA's action would undermine New Union's discretion in enforc-
ing the Act and would unfairly prejudice Goldthumb. EPA's ac-
tion also threatens New Union's authority to continue to enforce
the CWA and places the future protection of the State's water in
jeopardy.
EPA may argue that the holding in Gwaltney should be read
narrowly and that it therefore does not inform this Court's deci-
sion regarding the relationship between State and EPA enforce-
ment. The Supreme Court addressed both State and EPA
enforcement categorically as "governmental enforcement" in con-
trast to citizen suits. Such an interpretation of the holding, how-
ever, belies the reasoning of the Court. The Supreme Court's
decision was premised on concerns related to fairness and protec-
tion of the primary enforcer. 484 U.S. at 60 (stating that restric-
tions on citizen suits provide the regulated party with the
opportunity to bring itself into compliance with the Act). These
concerns apply equally regardless of whether it is the EPA or citi-
zens seeking to usurp the State's regulatory authority and upset
the decision made in the State's interest. This Court should apply
the reasoning of the Gwaltney line of cases and interpret the
§ 1319(g) bar in a manner that advances the congressional goal of
protecting the State's role in enforcement.
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B. EPA'S ASSERTION THAT STATES ARE REQUIRED TO
HAVE APPROVED PERMIT PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO
PRECLUDE EPA ENFORCEMENT UNDER § 1319(G)
IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE LANGUAGE OF
THE ACT
Not only does the reading of § 1319(g) proposed by EPA un-
dermine Congress's decision that States are to hold the primary
role in enforcing the Act, it is wholly unsupported by the language
of the Act. The CWA defines "State" to include the States, Wash-
ington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and territories of the United States with
no further limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3). This definition makes
no mention of approved permit programs and Congress did not al-
ter the definition in § 1319 (g). EPA asks this Court to read lan-
guage into § 1319 that Congress did not include in drafting the
Act and that would alter the definition of "State."
It is a well-established principle that "the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the statute itself." Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). While
other interpretations may be possible, the most natural reading of
§ 1319(g) does not include a requirement that the State have an
approved permit program. Congress easily could have included
language creating this requirement, but it chose not to do so.
Where Congress has chosen to not include a requirement in an
Act, the courts should not read such a requirement into the Act.
Bates, 522 U.S. at 29 (1997); 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Con-
taining Six Jars of Jam, 340 U.S. at 596 (1951).
The only reading of § 1319 supporting EPA's assertion-that
only States with approved permit programs may prevent federal
enforcement-eliminates EPA's authority to bring this action
under § 1319. Section 1319 allows an EPA enforcement action
only when the "Administrator finds that any person is in violation
of any condition or limitation . . . in a permit issued by a State
under an approved permit program." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1). EPA
appears to rely upon this language in asserting that New Union
must have an approved permit program to prevent federal en-
forcement under § 1319. The plain language of the Act, however,
leads to a much different conclusion. Congress chose to allow EPA
enforcement actions only for violations of permits issued by States
with approved permit programs; no such permit has been issued
in this case. The requirement that States operate under an ap-
proved permit program serves as a jurisdictional limit and there-
fore prevents the initiation of EPA enforcement actions. This
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jurisdictional limit does not allow a State to avoid enforcement re-
sponsibility while EPA stands aside because states must continue
to diligently exercise its enforcement requirements in order to pre-
serve their primary enforcement position. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at
60 (stating that an action by a secondary enforcer is an appropri-
ate enforcement method only when the primary enforcer has
failed to meet its enforcement responsibilities).
EPA urges this court to read a requirement into the § 1319(g)
preclusion of federal enforcement that is not apparent on the face
of the Act and which undermines the congressional intent that
States serve as the primary enforcers of the CWA. To do this,
however, requires the Court to ignore the express statement of
§ 1319(a)(1) that grants EPA enforcement authority only when
there is a violation of a permit issued under a State's approved
permit program. Stated simply, EPA asks the court to ignore the
express provision of § 1319(a)(1) and then read precisely the same
language into § 1319(g) thereby undermining the balance of en-
forcement authority created by Congress.
The federal prosecution bar that exists in § 1319 must be read
in light of Congress' preference for State enforcement and the
Act's various provisions protecting the role of the primary enforcer
and the plain language of the statute. Following the Gwaltney
line of cases, the court should read the § 1319(g) bar in a manner
that preserves the role of States in enforcing the Act. This bar is
part of a comprehensive enforcement scheme where citizens and
EPA would step into the shoes of a State that has failed to meet its
enforcement responsibilities. There is no evidence that New
Union has failed to meet this responsibility. Finally, there is no
language in the Act that supports EPA's assertion that States are
required to have approved permit programs in order to preclude
EPA enforcement under § 1319.
IV. STATES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ENFORCE
USING AUTHORITY COMPARABLE TO 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 TO PRECLUDE EPA ENFORCEMENT
CWA § 1319 requires that States take action under "compara-
ble state law" before they are able to prevent the EPA from exer-
cising its jurisdiction in a case. Courts have given the term
"comparable state law" broad meaning and have allowed States to
preclude action by secondary enforcers exercising authority
granted by statutes not identical to the CWA. N. and S. Rivers
Watershed v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991).
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In this case, New Union, through NUDEP, has exercised its statu-
tory power to regulate Goldthumb's discharges from the evapora-
tion ponds in a manner sufficient to preclude an EPA enforcement
action.
EPA argues that § 1319 should not deprive EPA of enforce-
ment authority in this case because New Union has not used en-
forcement authority comparable to § 1319(g) in this case. As
mentioned above, however, the States are the preferred enforcers
under the CWA and the provisions of § 1319 should be interpreted
to implement the regulatory scheme established by Congress.
New Union's statutes grant NUDEP the authority to assess ad-
ministrative penalties comparable to § 1319(g). NUDEP's deci-
sion to regulate Goldthumb's conduct under regulations more
suited to the facts of this case should not open the door for EPA to
undermine New Union's preferred position and replace its judg-
ment for that of NUDEP.
Courts have interpreted "comparable state law" to mean a
state law with the same basic penalty and notice provisions as the
CWA. Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381-
382 (8th Cir. 1994); N. and S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d at 556.
In order to meet the "comparable state law" requirement of
§ 1319(g), the state law provisions are not required to be identical
to the CWA; they must only be substantially similar. Saboe v. Ore-
gon, 819 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Or. 1993). Furthermore, States are
not required to actually assess a penalty so long as the state law
includes penalty assessment provisions similar to the CWA and
provides the authority to assess such a penalty. N. and S. Rivers
Watershed, 949 F.2d at 556.
In North and South Rivers Watershed, the First Circuit held
that Massachusetts enforced a violation under comparable state
law even though the precise section of the statute used by the
State did not include a provision allowing the assessment of civil
penalties. N. and S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d at 556. The court
reached this conclusion because the section used by Massachu-
setts is part of a statutory scheme implemented by the State for
the protection of its waters and other provisions of this scheme
provided for the assessment of civil penalties similar to the CWA.
Federal CWA jurisprudence has established the principle that
the courts define comparable state law to effectuate three related
polices. First, the courts should seek to implement Congress' de-
sire that the State serve as the primary enforcer of the CWA. Id. at
555-556. Second, the courts should apply the bar on actions by the
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secondary enforcers broadly so as to protect the interests of the
regulated party. Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 29 F.3d 376 (basing their de-
cision on extensive discussion of the regulated party's efforts to
comply with State enforcement actions); see also Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. at 60.
(stating that restrictions on citizen suits provide the regulated
party with the opportunity to bring itself into compliance with the
Act). Finally, the courts should apply the bar in a manner that
implements the overall purpose of the CWA. As discussed in the
preceding section, courts have consistently applied the CWA's bars
on secondary enforcement in a manner that protects the role of the
Act's preferred enforcers. In this context, the courts have applied
the broad meaning of comparable state law to protect the State's
discretion in administering the Act and enforcing violations. N.
and S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d at 556.
The courts have also interpreted the requirement to protect
the interests of the regulated parties. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60;
Ark. Wildlife Fed'n, 29 F.3d 376. Regulated parties enter into set-
tlement agreements with enforcers under the presumption that
they will not be subject to duplicative proceedings. Potential dis-
ruption of the agreements may cause regulated parties to hesitate
before entering these settlements and delay action to protect or
restore water quality. Whether a particular statute constitutes a
"comparable state law" does not involve whether the statutes have
precisely the same provisions, but rather whether the enforce-
ment action pursued by the State seeks to remedy the same viola-
tions as the duplicative action. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60.
The goal of all actions brought under the CWA is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation's water. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). When a state has taken
action to protect its waters, duplicative actions do not further this
goal. N. and S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d at 556. In fact, dupli-
cative actions may actually undermine this goal by directing re-
sources towards defending litigation rather than protecting the
waters. Id.
All three considerations used by the courts in applying a
broad meaning of "comparable state law" suggest that this Court
should extend this reasoning and find that New Union is not re-
quired to regulate Goldthumb's discharges under "comparable
state law" in order to preclude an EPA enforcement action. EPA
enforcement disrupts New Union's status as the preferred en-
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forcer of the Act, undermines Goldthumb's expectations, and does
not advance the goal protecting the nation's waters.
EPA admits that the New Union statutes grant NUDEP the
authority to assess penalties in a manner similar to § 1319(g).
Even though NUDEP did not use the statutory provision that
granted the authority to assess penalties, the holding of N. and S.
Rivers Watershed allows the court to hold that NUDEP did act
under comparable state law. The court allowed preclusion of a cit-
izen suit where a State prosecuted a violation of the CWA under a
statutory provision that did not provide for the assessment of civil
penalties, but rather was part of a regulatory program that did
provide such authority. N. and S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d at
556. Similarly, NUDEP acted under part of a statutory scheme
created by New Union to protect the integrity of the State's
environment.
It must be emphasized that the primary purpose of the bar is
to prevent duplicative enforcement proceedings for the same viola-
tion. NUDEP chose to use the State authority best suited to the
facts at hand. Rather than stretching the power of the CWA,
NUDEP chose to regulate Goldthumb's discharges under a sepa-
rate State law. Therefore the critical fact in this case is not the
law chosen by NUDEP, but rather the action regulated. EPA is
seeking to institute enforcement proceedings against Goldthumb
for precisely the same actions permitted by NUDEP. The CWA
establishes the State as the preferred enforcer, and the State's
choice to pursue enforcement under an alternate program should
not open the door for EPA to usurp the State's preferred status.
EPA's enforcement action has the additional consequences of
upsetting Goldthumb's reliance upon NUDEP's regulatory actions
and failing to further the goal of protecting water quality. EPA's
action thereby reopens a settled agreement between Goldthumb
and New Union and may subject Goldthumb to liability for con-
duct it believed was fully permissible and to which New Union
assented. Furthermore, there is no evidence that EPA's enforce-
ment regarding the wholly past actions by Goldthumb will have
any effect on the goal of protecting water quality except discourag-
ing future cooperative actions between Goldthumb and New
Union.
The same policies that have supported the broad interpreta-
tion of "comparable state law" apply in this case. The Court
should extend the § 1319 bar to situations where EPA attempts to
commence enforcement proceedings when a State, although it has
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the authority to assess civil 'penalties similar to § 1319, chose to
regulate the conduct under a different statutory provision also
seeking to protect the environment.
V. A STATE PENALTY ASSESSMENT THAT PREVENTS
EPA PENALTY ASSESSMENT UNDER 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (g) ALSO PREVENTS EPA FROM
SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Section 1319(g)(6) of the CWA provides that EPA may not en-
force against violators of the CWA if a State has already done so.
33 U.S.C. § 1319. As explained above, "it is the policy of the Con-
gress to recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Thus, on the basis of the State's
status as the preferred and primary enforcer of the CWA, jurispru-
dence concerning citizen suits, a secondary enforcement measure,
is relevant to the issue of whether or not EPA, as a secondary en-
forcer, is barred from seeking injunctive relief under
§ 1319(g)(6)(A).
The federal appellate courts are split as to whether 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319 (g)(6)(A) bars not only civil penalty actions, but also citizen
suits for injunctive relief. Applying this split to EPA enforcement
actions under § 1319(g)(6)(A), some courts would only bar EPA
from assessing penalties for violations against which the State
had already assessed penalties. Other appellate courts would bar
any EPA enforcement of violations that the State has already en-
forced in order to effectuate the statute's goal of allowing States to
take the lead in addressing water pollution within their
boundaries.
This Court should adopt the latter position and hold that
EPA's action for injunctive relief is barred because (a) Congress
intended the role of EPA enforcement actions to supplement, not
supplant, State enforcement action, and (b) the State agency
would otherwise have little power to enforce remediation. See
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 60 (1987); N. and S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc., 949
F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991). In addition, the dicta in Gwaltney sug-
gests that the Supreme Court would hold EPA enforcement ac-
tions for injunctive relief to be barred under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(6)(A). 484 U.S. at 60-61.Congress intended that EPA
enforcement actions supplement, not supplant, State enforcement
action, as evidenced by legislative history, and therefore
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§ 1319(g)(6)(A) bars injunctive relief. This intention is evidenced
by both the structure of the Act and its legislative history. S. Rep.
No. 92-414, at 73-74 (1972), reprinted in Legislative History of the
Clean Water Act, at 1481-82 (1973). (relevant language quoted
herein, see supra Part III.A).
On the basis of this legislative history, the Supreme Court in
Gwaltney interpreted the CWA to prevent a primary enforcer from
being supplanted by a subordinate enforcer. Gwaltney, 484 U.S.
at 60; accord N. & S. Rivers Watershed, 949 F.2d 552 (cited and
followed by, e.g., Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d
376, 383 (8th Cir. 1994) (different reasoning, same conclusion);
United States v. Smithfield Foods Co., 965 F. Supp. 769, 792 (E.D.
Va. 1997), affd on other grounds, 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999)).
While the facts in Gwaltney concerned a citizen group acting as
the subordinate enforcer, Congress' intent strongly supports find-
ing that as between a State and EPA, the State is to serve as the
primary enforcer and the EPA as the secondary enforcer.
Furthermore, unless Congress explicitly indicates that the
words of § 1319(g) have one meaning when applied to citizen suits
and another when applied to EPA actions, the text of § 1319(g)
barring citizen suits must be read as having the same meaning in
relationship to citizen suits as it does to EPA enforcement actions.
Congress did not indicate that different meanings should apply,
and therefore EPA enforcement actions, like citizen suits, are
barred under § 1319(g). Moreover, if EPA could bring actions for
injunctive relief despite the diligent prosecution by the State, then
EPA actions would clearly supplant State action.
In the case at bar, NUDEP issued two administrative orders
to Goldthumb in 2000 and 2001, pursuant to the New Union stat-
ute, prohibiting the discharge of pond liquid into the Arroyo d'Oro
when waters of the state are present and without prior permission
of NUDEP. Since the issuance of the initial administrative order
in 2000, Goldthumb has complied with NUDEP's orders. If EPA
were to now seek injunctive relief against Goldthumb, such action
would unquestionably supplant NUDEP's enforcement action and
likely destroy its successful mitigation effort. NUDEP's grant of
permission to Goldthumb to responsibly discharge pond wastes
would be rendered meaningless, and Goldthumb's practice of
keeping NUDEP informed of such discharges would serve no pur-
pose. Therefore, this Court should defer to NUDEP and bar an
EPA enforcement action for injunctive relief.
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Finally, State agencies would again have little to no power to
negotiate compliance if such settlements failed to shield polluters
from actions for injunctive relief. Remediation and mitigation
measures tailored by the agency to the particular violation would
still render the violator vulnerable to EPA compliance injunctions,
leaving little incentive to cooperate with the State agency. To en-
courage State authority and cooperative efforts between States
and violators to keep our nation's waters clean, this Court should
hold that EPA enforcement actions for injunctive relief are also
barred under § 1319(g)(6)(A).
Because the State enforcement agency, NUDEP, diligently
prosecuted Goldthumb for their alleged violation of the New
Union statute this Court should affirm the lower court's ruling
that a State penalty assessment that prevents EPA penalty as-
sessment under § 1319(g) also prevents EPA from seeking injunc-
tive relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of New Union respect-
fully requests that the Court reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the issue of whether the CWA confers juris-
diction over discharges into the Arroyo d'Oro when it is dry. While
New Union recognizes federal authority over Goldthumb's dis-
charge, it respectfully requests the Court to affirm the district
court's holding that New Union's previous enforcement actions
preclude EPA's enforcement of the discharges. Should this Court
not find that New Union's actions preclude EPA enforcement
under the CWA, New Union respectfully requests that the case be
remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
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APPENDIX A
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Commerce Clause: Congress has the
power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
STATUTES
CLEAN WATER ACT
33 U.S.C. § 1251. Congressional declaration of goals
and policy
(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biolog-
ical integrity of Nation's waters; national goals for achieve-
ment of objective. The objective of this chapter is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objection it is
hereby declared that, consistent with the provisions of this
chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an in-
terim goal of water quality which provides for the protec-
tion and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by
July 1, 1983;...
33 U.S.C. § 1311. Effluent limitations
(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in compliance with
law. Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 1319. Enforcement
(a) State enforcement; compliance orders
(1) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him,
the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of
any condition or limitation which implements section
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1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title in
a permit issued by a State under an approved permit pro-
gram under section 1342 or 1344 of this title, he shall pro-
ceed under his authority in paragraph (3) of this
subsection or he shall notify the person in alleged viola-
tion and such State of such finding. If beyond the thirti-
eth day after the Administrator's notification the State
has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the
Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person
to comply with such condition or limitation or shall bring
a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section.
(g) Administrative penalties
(6) Effect of Order
(A) Limitation on actions under other sections: Actions
taken by the Administrator or the Secretary, as the
case may be, Under this subsection shall not affect or
limit the Administrator's or Secretary's authority to
enforce any provision of this chapter; except that any
violation-
(i) with respect to which the Administrator or the
Secretary has commenced and is diligently pros-
ecuting an action under this subsection,
(ii) with respect to which a State has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting an action under a
State law comparable to this subsection, or for
(iii) which the Administrator, the Secretary, or the
State has issued a final order not subject to fur-
ther judicial review and the violator has paid a
penalty assessed under this subsection, or such
comparable State law, as the case may be,
shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under
subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this
title or section 1365 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1362. Definitions
(3) The term "State" means a State, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Somoa, the Commonwealth of the
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(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "dis-
charge of pollutants" each means (A) any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,.
REGULATIONS
40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Definitions
Waters of the United States or waters of the U.S. means:
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject tot eh ebb and flow of
the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;"
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands,"
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would af-
fect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including
any such waters:
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign trav-
elers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes
by industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of
the United States under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d)
of this definition;
(f) The territorial sea; and
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f)
of this definition.
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